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Clearing PTAs at the WTO Level
Clearing PTAs at the WTO Level Clearing PTAs at the WTO Level Clearing PTAs at the WTO Level All PTAs must be notified to the WTO (Art. XXIV GATT). 1 The Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements (CRTA), the successor to the Art. XXIV Working Parties, is the organ where all PTAs are being routinely notified. The CRTA is composed by delegates of all WTO Members and has always decided by consensus. 2 In principle, the CRTA has wide powers. Art. XXIV.7 GATT relevantly provides that it has the power:
"… to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate."
In principle, thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that the CRTA concludes that a notified PTA is GATT-inconsistent. This conclusion is underscored by the explicit wording of Art. XXIV.7(b) GATT dealing with interim agreements leading to PTAs:
"If … the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area … the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations." (emphasis added).
These provisions give the impression that the multilateral review was designed as an institution akin to a modern merger authority: PTAs would not be consumed unless cleared through the process established.
1 In this paper I do not deal with PTAs notified under the Enabling Clause, or under GATS (although much of the analysis is relevant to those schemes as well). 2 In theory, if a consensus decision cannot be reached, the matter can referred to the higher organs which can decide by majority voting. This has neither happened, not threatened to happen. There is no study to my knowledge, measuring the impact of this threat, which, intuitively speaking should be low in light of the collective preference, explained infra, for not enforcing this provision. Schott (1989) identifies four cases where PTAs were judged broadly consistent with the GATT.
Since his study there has been one case where there has been a definitive and unambiguous acceptance, at the CRTA level, that the notified PTA was GATT-consistent:
the CU between the Czech and the Slovak republics. We are simply in the dark as to the GATT-consistency of the remaining PTA currently in place. The inescapable conclusion is that the multilateral review has not delivered on its institutional promise. Non delivery has led to absence of outlawing a PTA so far. Recent empirical studies provide us with mixed evidence regarding the extent of trade diversion resulting from the formation of PTAs. We lack a comprehensive calculation of 4 I assume here a GATT-consistent PTA.
5
There are few papers that discuss this issue. In two recent papers, Saggi and co-authors design models with endogenous cuts in order to ascertain whether MFN cuts are a counterfactual to preferential cuts: Saggi and Yildiz (2010) find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2010) trade diversion for all PTAs (indeed one might wonder if one is feasible), but the ongoing tariff liberalization of tariffs at MFN-level would strongly argue in favour of the thesis that the problem is not of the magnitude that it used to be. 6
Scholarship points to the (missing) incentives to agree on MFN tariff cuts following establishment of a PTA; Bhagwati (2002) , Krishna (1998) and Limão (2006) all have contributed in making the point that, besides trade diversion created through the establishment of PTAs, members of PTAs behave as enemies of non-discriminatory trade liberalization, since they are unwilling to cut tariffs on MFN basis for fear of eroding the margin of preference that they have granted to their PTA-partners: they become thus, stumbling (as opposed to building) blocs opposing MFN trade liberalization, and frustrating the achievement of the basic WTO objective. The fear was probably legitimate at some point, but the question is how relevant is it today? On the one hand studies like Karacaovali and Limão (2008) looking at the EU, and Limão (2006) Trade diversion can also result from say increased use of antidumping (AD) proceedings against non PTA partners, as the work of Prusa and Teh (2010) shows. Once again though, nothing much can be done about it: at a positive level, the only MFN obligation that WTO Members incur with respect to AD duties is to collect them on nondiscriminatory basis; 7 at a normative level, the burden associated with proving that under similar circumstances PTA partners privileged AD proceedings against a sub-set of the WTO Membership (namely, outsiders to their PTA) is quite high: except for conceptual issues, those carrying the burden of proof (that is, the Members asked to pay them) will have to also address issues such as opportunity cost of conducting another investigation, scarcity of administrative resources etc. But there could be other, less immediate reasons arguing in favour of establishing a PTA.
Analysts routinely make the point that NAFTA was beneficial to Mexico not simply because the US lowered its tariff barriers to Mexican goods and services, but also because benefitted from other dynamic benefits, such as, increased investment over the years as a result of rationalization of its policies etc. 8 Baldwin (1993) correctly suggests that it is an onerous exercise to estimate the dynamic effects of preferential agreements; some of them, for example, might be shielded within the realm of private information that is never revealed to the rest of the world (e.g., side payments in the form of support for a permanent or temporary seat with the UN Security Council). In this vein, Winters and Schiff (1998) have argued that, under assumptions, trust can be built and conflict can be avoided through the formation of PTAs. As Baldwin himself notes, the difficulty of calculating similar benefits is no intellectual reason to outright exclude them from any calculation. 9 Recently, there is some empirical support for this view when authors have calculated some of the perks: Baltagi et al. (2008) discuss the relationship between PTAs and FDI regulation of commerce. If yes, then they anyway must be eliminated across PTA partners. And in times when the Membership cannot deliver on a much narrower promise circumscribing the Doha Round mandate, it would be cavalier to go for the wider picture.
Finally, one might argue that in the absence of likelihood to obtain tangible results, then we should reduce the bite of existing remedies. But this is where we are now anyway, with the advent of the Transparency Mechanism.
13 Mavroidis et al. (2010) .
14 Moreover, there is enough insurance policy in the WTO regime against obvious deviations: a PTA whereby partners lower their tariffs on one good only representing a very low volume of their trade could easily be found to violate the MFN obligations and not meet the substantially all trade-requirement, the lack of precise definition of the latter notwithstanding. Keep also in mind that dozens of empirical studies amply demonstrate that no similar PTAs exist. This observation in and of itself would cast severe doubt on remedial action against PTAs since it is questionable whether the same remedy should apply to divergent situations.
The historic rationale for PTAs is of no much help either. Arguably, one reason for its inclusion is that the GATT negotiators were presented with a fait accompli: two CU participated in the negotiation, the Syro-Lebanese customs union (Syria, Lebanon), and Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg). Institutional arrangements probably had to be made in order to accommodate these contracting parties. Chase (2006) drawing from a series of archival records, begs to differ and points to a different direction: the author persuasively demonstrates that it was the US negotiators that designed this provision in order to accommodate a trade agreement that they had secretly reached with Canada. The US -Canada FTA did not see the light of the day then but only 40 years later. On the other hand, the view held by many that the inclusion of a provision on
FTAs was there to accommodate the European integration process must be discarded: in the Havana Conference had taken place.
We are still struggling with the rationale but recent research paints a much rosier picture
for PTAs than what was the case before. One contributing factor is the success of the multilateral trading system: MFN reduction of tariffs results in reduction of trade diversion created through PTAs. So we are now facing a problem less acute than before.
Moreover, the content of PTAs has changed drastically over the recent years and moved to areas escaping the current WTO mandate. Finally, empirical evidence shows that PTAs can be welfare improving. And while all these changes were happening, the WTO continued to enforce an ill-informed and out-dated to constrain PTAs. Against this background, the shift towards a mere exercise in transparency (facilitated by the WTO Transparency Mechanism) should be welcome with relief. If at all, it removes the risk for false positives which can have important institutional (negative) external effects.
